The upcoming European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) is one of the more controversial climate policy instruments. Predictions about its likely impact and its performance can at present only be made to a certain degree. As long as the National Allocations Plans are not finally settled the overall supply of allowances is not determined. In this paper we will identify key features and key impacts of the EU ETS by scanning the range of likely allocation plans using the simulation model DART. The analysis of the simulation results highlights a number of interesting details in terms of allowance trade flows between member countries, of allowance prices, and in terms of the role of the accession countries in the ETS.
Introduction
When the European Emissions Trading Scheme (ETS) for CO 2 will start in 2005 it will be known as one of the more controversial climate policy instruments. It is designed to achieve an economically efficient reduction of CO 2 from major energy-intensive installations. Currently it covers around 40 000 installations in the European Union which are responsible for roughly 45 percent of all CO 2 -emmisions in the EU. As of today, there is considerable uncertainty about the impact of this trading scheme when it is in full operation and when the commitments of the member states of the EU to the KyotoProtocol will need to be met in 2012. Consequently, speculations sprout about winners and losers among the member states, about costs to different sectors within members states as well as about the question as to which member state will be a net-seller and which one a net-buyer of emission allowances. Also, the range of prices for emission allowances is still wide open. In fact, many statements about the likely outcome of the ETS are more based on the desire to further ones commercial interest than on a balanced analysis of the evidence available so far. Existing quantitative simulation studies (Böhringer 2002 , Capros et al. 2000 & 2002 only analyse preliminary scenarios of the ETS that, for example, do not include the accession countries or account for different likely allocation modes.
Predictions about the likely impact and the performance of the European ETS depend on the details of the allocation of emission rights within each member state. As long as the National Allocation Plans of the member states are not finally settled the overall supply of CO 2 -emission allowances is not determined. This obviously influences the price level for allowances. In addition, allocation rules that differ between member states will also influence trade flows. These issues of allocating the caps will be discussed below in greater detail. The second uncertainty concerns the fact that the impact of the EU ETS will exercise its full force in 2012. It is therefore necessary to assess the ETS in the light of the EU economy in the future; to be precise we choose 2012. This will be done with the help of the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 2003) , a computable general equilibrium model calibrated for the enlarged EU.
Nevertheless, it is possible to identify key features and key impacts of the EU ETS by scanning the range of likely allocation plans and by using a simulation analysis with the DART-model. This approach at the moment ignores some institutional details of the ETS such as the possibility for using the flexible mechanisms set out in the Kyoto-Protocol, i.e. Joint Implementation (JI) or the Clean Development Mechanism (CDM) which can potentially offer further inexpensive abatement options. It also ignores intertemporal issues such as banking and borrowing as well as the links to other national trading schemes in Denmark or the UK or to international trading activities. Despite these omissions the analysis highlights a number of interesting details about the EU ETS in terms of allowance trade flows between member countries, of allowance prices, and in terms of the role of the accession countries in the ETS.
In the following we first summarize the background of the EU ETS and the international climate policy commitments of the EU. We then describe the DART-model and the way in which the ETS is implemented in this simulation model. Finally, we discuss the results of the simulation exercises and draw some conclusions.
The European Kyoto Targets and the European Emissions Trading Scheme
In the Kyoto Protocol from 1997 the EU agreed to cut down their overall GHG To reach the European commitments at minimal costs a European Emissions trading scheme (ETS) for CO 2 was designed that is at the heart of this paper.
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The ETS will start in 2005 and all member states of the European Union will be required to impose binding, absolute caps on CO 2 emissions of facilities in energy activities, the production, and processing of ferrous and non-ferrous metals, the mineral industry and the pulp, paper and board production. 
Simulating the Effects of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme
An assessment of the likely allocation and welfare effects of the ETS requires at least two modelling steps. The first consists of the setting up of an appropriate economic model with which the European economy can be simulated for the time in which the trading scheme will be in full force. The second step involves the design of policy scenarios which are likely to arise between today and the time at which the Kyoto-Commitments are to be met.
As a simulation tool we use the DART-model (Klepper, Peterson, Springer 2003) which will be shortly characterized. We then derive the emission caps for the different member states that need to be met by 2012.
2 Except for the candidate countries Bulgaria and Rumania these countries will join the EU in Mai 2004. For Bulgaraia and Rumania accession to the EU is scheduled for 2007, the beginning of the second trading period of the ETS.
The DART-Model
The DART (Dynamic Applied Regional Trade) Model is a multi-region, multisector recursive dynamic CGE-model of the world economy. For the simulation of the European ETS it is calibrated to an aggregation of 16 regions. Table 1 illustrates the 9 countries or group of countries of the EU including the accession countries of Eastern Europe and the other 7 world regions. is planned but not decided. It excludes the Baltic Countries which are aggregated in region FSU. This is due to the regional disaggregation of the current GTAP data set. This inconsistency has only a small effect since it distorts CO 2 -emissions of ACC by less than 5 percent.
In each region or country the economy is disaggregated into 12 sectors. Four of these sectors participate in the ETS. Although there is no perfect match between the installations subject to the ETS and the sectoral structure of DART, we believe it to be sufficiently close. In addition, it also covers about 45 percent of the CO 2 -emissions. The economy in each region is modelled as a competitive economy with flexible prices and market clearing. There exist three types of agents: a representative consumer, a representative producer in each sector, and regional governments. All regions are connected through bilateral trade flows.
The DART-model has a recursive-dynamic structure solving for a sequence of static one-period equilibria. The major exogenous drivers are the rate of productivity growth, the savings rate, the rate of change of the population, and the change in human capital.
The model is calibrated to the GTAP5 data base that represents production and trade data for 1997. The elasticities of substitution for the energy goods coal, gas, and crude oil are calibrated in such a way as to reproduce the mission projections of the EIA (EIA 2002). 
Integration of Policy Scenarios in DART
The simulation of the ETS requires first a determination of the emission caps for the EU member states. Table 3 shows the Kyoto targets for each region or country based on the EU Burden-Sharing Agreement to the Kyoto-Protocol (also see Figure 1 ). 4 The cap on country groups is the emission weighted • The "historical emissions approach" (HIS)
• The "forecasting approach" (FUT)
• The "least cost approach" (LC).
In the historical approach the total number of allowances allocated to the ETS installations is determined by multiplying the share of emissions of ETS Finally, the least cost approach tries to take into account the fact that CO 2 -abatement activities carry substantially different costs in different sectors.
From an efficiency point of view this would not matter if all emission sources were to participate in the trading scheme. But since abatement costs will equalize only within the ETS, there is a danger that the historical and the forecasting approach may lead to strong differences in marginal abatement costs between the sectors within ETS and those outside the ETS. The least cost approach tries to take account of this inefficiency by dividing the cap 4 ACC does not participate in the burden-sharing.
between ETS and Non-ETS sectors in such a way that the different abatement cost levels are recognized. Hence, the least-cost approach allocates relatively few allowances to sectors with low abatement costs.
The In the policy simulations below we ignore the hot-air in most cases and assume that the emission targets are set at the business-as-usual level. If the hot-air is included we assume that all hot-air is allocated to the trading sectors. We also concentrate in the following on the "least-cost" allocation rule for reasons that will be apparent in the discussion of the results in section 4.1.
Simulation Results
In this section we present the results from simulating the scenarios described in the previous section. We present the results of the DART-model for the year 2012 when the ETS is in full force and the Kyoto-targets under the EU burdensharing agreement need to be met. We first report and discuss the results for the allowance prices. Then we show the trade in allowances across the EU.
Finally, we take a look at the changes in sectoral output and the expected competitiveness and welfare effects.
Allowance Prices
One of the major outcomes of the EU ETS that will determine its allocation effects is a uniform allowance price, i.e. a price on CO 2 , throughout the EU. 
Trade in Emission Permits
Abatement costs for CO 2 vary not only within a country but to an even larger degree across countries. As can be seen in Figure 
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This is due to a number of factors such as the size of the emission cap relative to the BAU emissions, the availability of inexpensive abatement options, or to the availability of hot-air.
The ETS of the EU turns out to lead to a rather lopsided affair. The accession countries will export allowances to all other member states. 
Competitiveness Effects
A major concern of policy makers and industry is that the ETS will have The most remarkable result from comparing the ETS with a unilateral climate policy is the fact that all energy-intensive sectors gain from the ETS. Of course, the energy sectors and the energy-intensive industries inside the ETS can reduce their output losses by more than 50 percent. But these cost savings also carry over to the other energy-intensive industries to some extent. (3) Reaching the Kyoto targets requires severe reductions outside the ETS as well. As shown already in section 4.1, taxes that are associated with these reductions are much higher than the allowance price. As a result, the sectors outside the ETS are affected more strongly than the sectors inside.
Finally it should be noted, that the strength of the effects differs between individual countries. Some of the main factors that influence this strength are discussed in the next section. In addition, the differences in the energy intensity as e.g. described for the chemical sector in the Benelux countries do play a role. For more details see also Peterson (2003) .
The Welfare Costs of Different EU Climate Strategies
The main goal of the EU emissions trading scheme is to reduce the welfare costs of meeting the European emission targets. Figure 9 shows the aggregated EU welfare changes relative to the BAU scenario in the different trading scenarios compared to a scenario where the individual commitments are reached unilaterally by a uniform, country specific CO 2 tax (UNI) . However, this gain is due to the fact that the overall amount of emissions is substantially higher than in the trading scheme without hot-air.
Turning to the economic costs for the individual EU member countries, these can differ considerably. Figure 10 shows the welfare changes across countries for the UNI and the LC scenario. Again, the welfare cost under LC is the light grey bar and under UNI it is the sum of the light and dark grey bars. • The strictness of the national Kyoto-target relative to the business-asusual emissions, and
• the differences in abatement costs across different member states.
Both of these factors are illustrated by the implicit CO 2 -taxes necessary to achieve the Kyoto-targets unilaterally (see Figure 5 in section 4.2). The largest gains from ETS accrue to the Benelux countries (BEN) and Austria and Ireland (REU) because they experience the largest difference between allowance price and unilateral tax rate.
France experiences no gains from trading in the ETS although it has the same implicit unilateral CO 2 -tax than Germany which can lower its welfare costs from 1.2 percent to 1.0 percent. This is due to the fact that France is not trading many allowances because of its low emission intensity in the electricity sector.
Hence, it can not reap large gains from trading as much of the emission reduction will need to take place outside the ETS. replaced by efficient ones, the distorting effects would be even larger thus further limiting the positive contribution of the ETS to overall welfare. However, this is not due to defects of the ETS itself but to the lack of a broader coverage of the ETS across all emitting sectors.
Turning to the competitiveness effects it should be clear that it is not the trading scheme that imposes new restrictions but the Kyoto-target itself. The ETS is only a means to achieve this target at higher or smaller social cost. If
